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Lobbying and Information in Politics
JOHN M. DE FIGUEIREDO
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The vast majority of papers written about interest groups’ political in uence
focuses on the role of money in politics. Business and interest groups’ participation in campaign  nance, in the form of hard and soft money, has been the
subject of hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies. Moreover, with the
recent congressional moves to reform campaign  nance laws, campaign  nance
studies have received a prominent position in public discourse.
There are two striking results about this line of academic work. First, political
action committees (PACs) gave $245 million to congressional candidates in form
of campaign contributions in the 1999–2000 election cycle (about $123 million
annually), and corporations, unions, and interest groups gave $153 million in
“soft money” to political parties during the 1997–1998 election cycle (about $76
million annually).1 Yet, Congress controls a $2 trillion budget, nearly 40 percent
of which is discretionary spending. This raises a potential puzzle: why do
interest groups pay so little ($200 million annually) to try to in uence policy?
To answer this question, we turn to a second striking result from the academic
literature. There is little credible evidence any of these forms of campaign
 nance have any effect on policy outcomes (This, of course, leaves the question
open as to why PACs and corporations give money to candidates and parties at
all.)
So what does matter? There is an emerging literature that looks at information
as a more in uential instrument in affecting policy outcomes than campaign
contributions . Information takes many forms: statistics, facts, arguments, forecasts, threats, commitments, signals, or some combination of the aforementioned. If we assume, as most of political economy literature assumes, that the
politician’s objective is reelection (or election to a higher of ce), then the
politician seeks information on how her vote on a given issue will affect the
outcome of her next election. There may be intermediate forms of information—
such as how many jobs a policy position will create, how constituent s will be
affected by an yea or nay vote, whether business leaders will support her in the
next election—but ultimately the key piece of information the politician cares
about is how her reelection, or more speci cally votes, will be affected by the
policy position she takes on the current issue.
Correspondence: Professor John M. de Figueiredo, Sloan School of Management , Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Room E52–545, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 , Email: jde g@mit.edu
1. I use the 1997–1998 data on soft money to keep out party activity engaged in support of the presidential election
of 2000.
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The manifestation of information transfer between interest groups and policymakers is lobbying. Lobbying is about investments in information accumulation,
organization, and transfer by corporations and interest groups. Lobbying affects
all levels of government, from civil servants in administrativ e agencies to the
highest levels of elected politicians . Recent disclosure requirements imposed by
Congress suggest that reported lobbying expenditures are almost ten times that
of all forms of campaign  nance.2 In 2000, $1.51 billion was reportedly spent
on lobbying by interest groups.3
But even this is not a large amount. Although numerous case studies suggest
that lobbying and information transfer greatly affect voting behavior in Congress
and in uence decisionmakin g in administrative agencies, there has been little
statistica l evidence. A recent study attempting to quantify the return to lobbying
estimates that a small amount of lobbying can have enormous monetary returns
when the constituent s lobbying are represented by a legislator who can deliver
the policy. 4 Moreover, this work suggests that, on the margin, interest groups are
optimizing by setting marginal bene t to marginal cost of lobbying.5 These facts,
together with the high investment made in lobbying and the high return to
lobbying, lend credence to the argument that there is an important empirical
justi cation for believing that lobbying can have a large impact on policy
outcomes. Indeed, interest groups need not spend much. Once they provide the
legislator with the key piece of credible information of the impact of her voting
behavior on reelection, all additional information has little marginal value.
The articles and accompanying commentaries in this issue address lobbying
and information in politics. They theoretically and empirically address how
information affects the behavior of legislators, regulators, and interest groups. In
the  rst paper, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi (AST) integrate the campaign
 nance literature with the lobbying literature to examine the access hypothesis,
which posits that PAC contribution s do not affect policy per se, but are used to
signal to a legislator the value of information the interest group has on a
particular issue. Thus PAC contribution s are mechanisms for interest groups to
gain access to legislators so that they can engage in a more valuable activity—
lobbying. AST begin with an interesting empirical observation: although only
one- fth of groups have both a PAC and a lobbyist, these groups account for 86
percent of PAC expenditures and 70 percent of reported lobbying expenditures.
This is suggestive of the tight linkage between PAC spending and lobbying. The
paper explores this relationship further, showing that interest groups that lobby
heavily tend to evenly distribute their PAC money to legislator s across the
ideological spectrum, focusing on legislators in positions of power. Interest
groups that lobby very little tend to focus their PAC money on close electoral
contests. This, in turn, is consistent with the main prediction of the access
hypothesis : interest groups for whom lobbying is important will target individu2.
3.
4.
5.

Ansolabehere , de Figueiredo and Snyder (2002).
Milyo et al. (2000).
There is also surely unreported lobbying.
de Figueiredo and Silverman (2002). In fact, the average return to a dollar of lobbying is shown to be $11—$45
for universities that are represented by legislators on powerful committees (Appropriations Committees).
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als in position of power, independent of partisanship (i.e., the legislators who are
most able to deliver policy). Ideological groups, on the other hand, will tend to
focus their money on like-minded partisans in close elections.
In his commentary on this paper, Milyo  nds one key contribution of AST is
its framework for distinguishin g between access-oriented PACs and ideological
PACs. However, Milyo notes two additional facts. First, PAC contribution s are
largely irrelevant to policy outcomes and, second, AST show that PAC contributions are highly correlated with lobbying expenditures. Ergo, lobbying is
independent of policy outcomes. While he is not ready to embrace this conclusion in its entirety, he does note that the AST paper does point to a possible
resolution for this problem when they suggest that future research should
account for the multiplicit y and heterogeneity of modes of political in uence
across  rms and interest groups. A disaggregatio n of different types of PACs and
different types of lobbying, as is done in AST, may allow us to resolve this
paradox.
In the second paper, “The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups:
Lobbying, Litigation, and Administrative Regulation,” de Figueiredo and de
Figueiredo (DD) examine lobbying of administrative agencies by interest groups.
The paper is concerned with the role of subsequent litigation and judicial review
of administrativ e agency decisionmaking , and how that affects the incentives of
interest groups to lobby the agency in the  rst stage. In doing this, DD
incorporate the behavior of interest groups into the more traditiona l separation
of powers models that have been developed in political science. In the formal
model, information is modeled as a resource transfer to the regulator, in much
the way that information can be thought of as resources. DD initially show that
wealthier interest groups are more likely to lobby. More interesting, though, is
how judicial behavior can affect lobbying of administrative agencies. Modeling
ideological regulators and courts as responsive to resources, they show that as
courts become more biased against change, interest group lobbying investments
become smaller, and may be eliminated all together. However, as courts become
more responsive to resources, the effect it has on lobbying by interest groups is
dependent upon the underlying ideology of the court relative to the interest
groups and regulator.
This link between interest group lobbying and the behavior of courts is the
focal point of Johnston’s commentary on this paper. He  nds the most important
contributio n of the paper to be its elucidation of how higher levels of con ict
over preferred policy outcomes between the court and the regulator decrease
incentives to lobby. Indeed, lobbying can be eliminated altogether in the extreme
case. Johnston then describes an alternative model, where  rms must commit
real resources, and where, under the right sort of statutory regime, judicial
review may actually alter an agency’s fundamental incentive to regulate.6 He
shows in this set-up, as in DD, that an “extreme” form of judicial review can
completely alter lobbying incentives. Thus, he argues, the result shown in DD is
likely very general, and thus deserves closer attention.
6. Johnston (2002).
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In the third paper “Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the
Vote of Con dence Procedure,” Bennedsen and Feldmann (BF) extend the
analysis of lobbying to the international arena in examining how the structure of
a legislature affects an interest group’s incentive to lobby. In particular, they
examine how the vote of con dence procedure, which is attached to each bill
proposed in a parliamentary system, might affect the ability of information to
change a legislator’s vote. This, in turn, affects the incentives of interest groups
to collect and disseminate information to a legislator. BF develop an in nitely
repeated game model of legislative bargaining with a  nite interelection period
and explore how parliamentary systems are different from congressiona l systems. This is akin to having governments serve a  nite period of time before
they must call an election, in the absence of a vote of con dence. The key detail
is that because every vote in a parliamentary system can be a vote of con dence
in the current government, legislators in the majority of such a system have less
incentive to change their vote in response to information. Thus, interest groups
have less incentive to engage in information gathering and disseminatio n than
they would in a congressional system, where a single vote can fail, but a
government will continue.
Baron, in his commentary, extends the BF paper to an in nitely timed
interelection model where legislator s are assumed to use stationary strategies (to
avoid the multiple equilibria inherent in in nite games). This allows the
government to be in power for a potentially in nite duration because, absent the
vote of con dence, failure of the government is an exogenous, constant probability event, re ected in the actors’ discount rates. BF show that if the reelection
is far enough away, there will be no lobbying at all in a parliamentary system.
Baron sets a bound on this no-lobbyin g equilibrium based on the discount rate
in the in nite period model. The two papers have similar results, despite their
different interelection assumptions . In BF, as mandatory reelection get closer,
there will be an increase in lobbying; in Baron, as there is increasing uncertainty
about government survivability (exogenous probability of survival is low), there
is increased lobbying.
In the  nal paper, “Closure and Capture in Federal Advisory Committees,”
Karty describes the history of federal advisory committees (primarily to administrative agencies) and the tendencies of these committees to be captured by
interest groups. In this paper, Karty explains why advisory committees play an
essential role in policymaking , and how they become susceptible to capture. The
paper provides statistics on the origin, number, and composition of all federal
advisory committees, and shows universities and research institute members are
the most heavily represented group on these committees, giving credence to the
“expert” advisory nature of these committees. However, after subjecting his data
to a variety of econometric tests, Karty argues that patterns of closure are
consistent with capture theories.
In all, the papers extend both the theoretical and empirical reach of the
lobbying and in uence literature. They illustrate how information provision is
important across all rulemaking bodies—legislatures, agencies, and courts—and
how theories of information transmission in politics are portable across countries
with different structures of government. Bringing together rigorous mathematical
128

Brought to you by | Duke University
Authenticated | 152.3.128.54
Download Date | 9/13/12 3:22 PM

Lobbying and Information in Politics
and statistical analysis, the papers elevate the discourse on lobbying. Readers
should  nd these papers and commentaries useful in extending their thinking
about lobbying and information in politics.
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